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NOTE
The General Aptitude Test Battery and
the Debate Over Race Norming, Racial
Preferences, and Affirmative Action
By EMILY PRESCOTr*
It has been argued that the use of affirmative race-conscious reme-
dies inflicts an immediate harm on some, in the hope of ameliorat-
ing a more remote harm done to others.... Some have compared
the use of such race-conscious remedies to using alcohol to get be-
yond alcoholism, or drugs to overcome a drug addiction, or a few
more cigarettes a day to break the smoking habit.... Affirmative
action is not, as the analogies appear to imply, a symptom of lack
of societal will-power; when judiciously employed, it is instead an




When Congress passed the 1991 Civil Rights Act,2 its intent was to
overturn seven recent Supreme Court civil rights cases.' In addition, the
Act contained a provision specifically prohibiting one type of conduct-
race norming.
4
* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 1993; A.B., Duke Univer-
sity, 1987.
1. Address to the Judicial Conference of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (1986),
quoted in Mr. Justice Marshall Lives on in His Words, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 8, 1993, at 8.
2. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 106, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991)
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1)) [hereinafter 1991 Civil Rights Act].
3. See, eg., 137 CoNG. Rc. E3, 837 (1991). The cases overturned by the Civil Rights
Act included Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) and Martin v. Wilkes,
490 U.S. 754 (1989).
4. 1991 Civil Rights Act, supra note 2. Section 106 states in part:
(1) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for a respondent, in connection with
the selection or referral of applicants or candidates for employment or promotion, to
adjust the scores of, use different cutoff scores for, or otherwise alter the results of,
employment related tests on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
[877]
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Race norming is the practice of adjusting minority employment test
scores5 so that a minority test-taker's score is based on a comparison
with other test-takers of the same race instead of with the general popula-
tion of test-takers.6 Conversion of test scores was performed primarily in
conjunction with the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB), a job refer-
ral test administered by state employment agencies across the country.7
When journalist Robert G. Holland brought race norming to na-
tional attention,' he sparked a national debate.9 This debate exposed a
broad-based concern over affirmative action programs and the question
of potential reverse discrimination. The controversy over the use of race
norming on the results of general ability tests reflects more fundamental
concerns about affirmative action policies. Are the tests valid predictors
of job performance? What kind of job referral program, if any, should
the government promote? When, if ever, is it acceptable to utilize racial
classifications in hiring practices? How can our society reconcile the pos-
itive goals of affirmative action with the negative backlash against per-
ceived reverse discrimination?
The Department of Labor (D.O.L.) is examining the General Apti-
tude Test Battery (GATB) in depth.10 As former Labor Secretary Lynn
Martin explained, "[t]he concentration on race norming has had the ben-
eficial effect of forcing the department to scrutinize not just [the] GATB,
but the entire testing system."11 Pursuant to the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
the D.O.L. has ordered state employment service agencies to discontinue
race norming.12 Although the D.O.L. explained that states are still free
5. The practice of race-norming test scores is not limited to the employment context; it
can also come into question in educational testing. This Note, like the provision in the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, focuses solely on race norming as it relates to employment.
6. Race norming is officially termed "within-group scoring" by the Department of La-
bor. See infra part I.B for a discussion of the mechanics of race norming.
7. See infra notes 22-32 and accompanying text.
8. See Robert G. Holland, Big Brother's Test Scores, NAT'L REv., Sept. 3, 1990, at 35,
36. See also Linda S. Gottfredson, Hiring Quotas Exist, But Employers Won't Tell, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 1, 1990, A20 (etter to the editor).
9. See, e.g., The Quota Question: When Does Affrmative Action Become Reverse Discrim-
ination?, ECONOMIsT, Nov. 30, 1991, at 27; Phil Galley, Civil-Rights Fight Brings Racial Sub-
text to the Surface, CHI. Tai., June 7, 1991, § 1, at 25; Holly K. Hacker, Adjusted Federal
Employment Tests Stir Controversy, L.A. TIMES, June 6, 1991, at AS; Ethan Bronner, Scoring
of Job Tests Under Fire, CHI. TRIB., May 25, 1991, § 1, at 2.
10. The D.O.L. originally proposed a two-year, $6 million research project aimed at im-
proving the validity and predictability of the GATB. Steven A. Holmes, State Job Agencies
May Not Give Edge to Minority Testees, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1991, § 1, at 1, 47. The Bush
administration chose HRStrategies, Inc. of Grosse Pointe, Michigan to conduct a one-year
project that will include reviewing and updating the GATB. See Bush Administration and
Corporate America Choose Michigan Firm to Help Attack U.S. Work Force 'Skills Gap', PR
NEWSWiRE, Jul. 24, 1992 [hereinafter Michigan Firm].
11. Labor Secretary Calls Race Norming Aptitude Test Review 'In-Depth" Daily Rep.
Exec. (BNA) No. 165, at A3 (Aug. 26, 1991).
12. Holmes, supra note 10, at 1.
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to use the GATB, it recommended that the test be used in conjunction
with other employment criteria such as job experience and educational
levels. 13 Most states, however, have abandoned the GATB as a referral
tool until the D.O.L. completes its in-depth review.14
The race norming debate implicates broader concerns about how to
combat societal discrimination against minorities. Two decades ago, it
was perhaps easier to recognize employers who intentionally discrimi-
nated. Today, unintentional, subtle discrimination is often most discerni-
ble by observing the disparate impact of various hiring practices on
minorities. From an equal protection viewpoint, there appears to be little
the Supreme Court will do to protect against this type of discrimina-
tion; 5 from a societal viewpoint, it is imperative that we find the means
to combat this problem.
This Note looks at the constitutional issues raised by use of the
GATB and the practice of race norming. Although race norming in the
employment context was outlawed by Congress with the passage of the
1991 Civil Rights Act, it should still be examined in the context of racial
preferences more generally. Outlawing race norming does not end the
dilemma posed by racial preferences; it is only one more development in
the equal protection and affirmative action debate. The GATB, though
currently in disuse, will probably be heavily utilized again by state em-
ployment agencies.16 Meanwhile, other employment and promotion tests
continue to present similar disparate impact problems.17 It is also possi-
ble that non-minorities 8 will challenge past employment decisions that
may have been affected by race norming. Therefore, it is imperative that
two goals be simultaneously pursued: first, test developers must attempt
to update employment tests so that they truly correlate with job perform-
ance without excluding capable minorities; 9 second, employers must be
able to use race-conscious measures other than race norming in order to
evaluate a potential employee in a manner that is fair to minorities and
13. Holmes, supra note 10, at Al.
14. Michigan Firm, supra note 10.
15. See infra part II.A. Title VII can provide a cause of action for disparate impact. See
infra part II.B.2.
16. See Michigan Firm, supra note 10. The GATB is being updated so that it will be "as
good a predictor and placement tool as possible," but no exact time frame has been set for how
long this will take. Id.
17. See, e.g., Bridgeport Guardians v. City of Bridgeport, 735 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Conn.
1990), af#'d, 933 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1991); San Francisco Police Officers Association v. San
Francisco, 979 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1992).
18. Although the term "non-minority" overwhelmingly means "white" in the affirmative
action context, the United States Employment Services (U.S.E.S.) included "Asian" in the
non-minority category when it developed score conversion charts for the GATB. See infra
note 27. Depending on the context, this Note will utilize both "non-minority" and "white."
19. This was a goal stated by former Secretary of Labor Lynn Martin upon awarding a
contract to HRStrategies to study the GATB. Michigan Firm, supra note 10.
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non-minorities alike. This Note attempts to further both goals by exam-
ining constitutional and Title VII questions posed by using an employ-
ment test, with or without race-conscious measures, as a referral and
hiring tool, and by proposing potential race-conscious solutions. The
GATB and race norming will be used as models to determine the validity
of other employment tests and race-conscious hiring practices.
Part I presents background information on the General Aptitude
Test Battery and the implementation and mechanics of race norming.
Part II examines the validity of race norming and the GATB and ana-
lyzes the Supreme Court's treatment of race-conscious measures under
both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 0 and
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.21 Part III explores approaches
the Court has taken toward equal protection and Title VII that support
race-conscious measures and offers proposals for race-conscious meas-
ures that would garner the approval of the Court.
I. Background Information on the General Aptitude Test
Battery and the Mechanics of Race Norming
A. The General Aptitude Test Battery
The GATB is a federally sponsored employment test that measures
basic skills such as math, reading, and manual dexterity for low-level
manufacturing and clerical jobs.22 It was developed in the late 1940s by
the U.S. Employment Service (U.S.E.S.), a division of the Department of
Labor.23 While the format of the test was designed by the U.S.E.S., ac-
tual implementation has been governed by state-administered employ-
ment services. The results have been used for vocational counseling and
job referral purposes.24 Job applicants who have taken the GATB have
been referred to both private and public sector employers in over 12,000
job categories.2" Prior to the enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
state employment services had administered the test to approximately
600,000 people per year in thirty states.26
20. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant
part: "No state shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1964).
22. Holmes, supra note 10, at 47.
23. FAIRNESS IN EMPLOYMENT TESTING: VALIDITY GENERALIZATION, MINORITY IS-
SUES, AND THE GENERAL APTITUDE TEST BATTERY I (John A. Hartigan & Alexandra K.
Wigdor eds., 1989) [hereinafter FAIRNESS].
24. Id.
25. Id. at 3.
26. Holmes, supra note 10. State employment service personnel see between 17 million
and 18 million job-seekers every year. DOL Officials Announce Termination of Controversial
GATB Scoring Method, DAILY REP. EXEC. (BNA) No. 241, at A10 (Dec. 16, 1991) [hereinaf-
ter Termination].
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B. The Mechanics of Race Norming
In order to achieve a racially balanced job referral system, the
D.O.L. implemented within-group score conversion, or race norming, for
the GATB. State employment service agencies converted the raw scores
of the GATB into percentile scores within the categories of "black,"
"Hispanic," and "other." 27 These percentile scores were determined us-
ing conversion tables created by the U.S.E.S.28 The percentile scores
were then forwarded to both public and private sector employers.29
Although raw scores were available, many employers were not aware
that test scores were being adjusted.30
The U.S.E.S. justified the use of race norming because it balanced
out the inequities created by top-down GATB score reporting.31 Ac-
cording to the U.S.E.S. staff, "[t]he purpose of these score adjustments,
which serve to erase group differences in test scores, is to mitigate the
adverse effects that rank-ordering on the basis of test score would other-
wise have on the employment opportunities of minority job seekers.",
32
C. The Rise and Fall of the Race-Normed GATE
Debate over the GATB and its disparate impact on minority appli-
cants can be traced back to a 1972 referral policy negotiated between the
D.O.L., the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.),
and the Department of Justice (D.O.J.). This policy stipulated that "re-
ferrals of tested minority applicants should be in proportion to their pres-
ence in the applicant pool in all cases in which the tests had not been
validated for minority applicants to the job in question.13 3 This policy
reflected two basic concerns. The first concern explicitly centered on the
question of valid prediction of job performance. In 1972, there was little
information on correlation between the GATB scores and subsequent job
performance, leaving a high risk of discrimination against minority appli-
cants who scored low on the test.34 A second, related concern was the
desire to promote equal employment opportunity; minorities who were
equally capable of performing well at a job would not have been hired
27. FAIRNEss, supra note 23, at 20. "Other" encompasses all those not in the first two
categories and includes both whites and Asians. Id.
28. Id. In conducting their review of the GATB, the authors of the FAIRNESS report had
difficulty replicating the factors used to create the conversion tables despite a careful review of
the GATB technical manuals. Id. at 84.
29. Id. at 1.
30. Id. at 213.
31. Without race-norming the GATB results, top-down score reporting would have had a
disparate impact on the hiring of minority test-takers.
32. Id. at 2.
33. Id. at 21-22.
34. Id. at 21.
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without the adoption of race norming.35
The D.O.L. found it had a dilemma. Rank, or top-down, ordering
of GATB scores would have had an adverse effect on the employment
opportunities of minority jobseekers,36 yet the test had not been validated
for correlation with job performance.37 The D.O.L. regarded the imple-
mentation of race norming as an extension of the 1972 referral policy,
designed to avoid discrimination against minorities.38
Faced with budget cuts and staff reductions, the Department of La-
bor hoped to increase use of the GATB for job referrals because use of an
employment test could be more efficient than other referral methods.39
Yet the D.O.L. realized that it was in a Catch-22 situation. Under the
Equal Protection Clause, race norming could be construed as reverse dis-
crimination, whereas under Title VII, use of the GATB without race
norming would be invalid because it would result in a disproportionate
impact on minority job seekers. As noted by the authors of the Fairness
in Employment Testing report,
employee selection on the basis of rank-ordered test scores will
screen out a large proportion of black and Hispanic candidates and
thus expose employers (and the Employment Service) to legal ac-
tion under the civil rights laws on grounds of discrimination; the
use of score adjustments to mitigate these adverse effects on the
employment chances of minority job seekers creates vulnerabilities
to charges of reverse discrimination.'
Before the D.O.L. undertook the study resulting in the Fairness in Em-
ployment Testing report, race norming was its solution to this dilemma.
This same dilemma will continue to face employers and employment
agencies who utilize the GATB or any other test to make hiring and
promotion decisions.
In response to a D.O.J. challenge to race norming,41 the D.O.L.
asked the National Research Council (N.R.C.)42 to study the validity of
the GATB in predicting job performance. 43 The N.R.C. studied the is-
sue of race norming, the validity of the GATB as a predictor of success-
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Id at 22.
38. Id. at 21.
39. Id. at 1. The D.O.L. was also hoping to increase economic activity by improving the
person-job match. Id.
40. id at 3.
41. This challenge was brought in 1986. Id at 34.
42. The members of the National Research Council are drawn from the councils of the
National Academy of Sciences, the National Academy of Engineering, and the Institute of
Medicine. The National Research Council provides research services to the federal govern-
ment, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. Id. at ii.
43. This study resulted in the FAIRNEss IN EMPLOYMENT TESTING report. See FAIR-
NESS, supra note 23.
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ful job performance, and the effects on various groups of widespread
adoption of the GATB as a referral tool.' According to the study, high
GATB scores did show modest correlation with successful job perform-
ance, 5 but the N.R.C. found there was a "far less than perfect relation
between [an applicant's] score and job performance."46 This "far less
than perfect" relation was the scientific justification posited by the
N.R.C. for the continued use of race norming for minority examinees'
scores.
47
As noted by the report's authors, "the modest validities of the
GATB cause selection errors that weigh more heavily on minority work-
ers than on majority workers."4 When selecting by rank order of test
scores, there is always the risk that applicants who will not turn out to be
successful workers will still be referred to employers because of high test
scores. This defect is known as false-acceptance. Conversely, applicants
who can perform successfully at work may be screened out of job referral
because of lower scores. This is known as false-rejection.49 Without race
norming of the GATB results, false-rejection selection errors would re-
sult in a disproportionate number of minority job applicants not selected
for employment who are capable of performing well once on the job.50
As a result of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, employment test results
can no longer be race normed. However, continued use of the GATB
without race norming of test results could be the subject of legal chal-
lenges based on alleged invalidity of the test and disparate impact on
minorities.51 There are a number of grounds on which a lawsuit could be
brought, depending on the particular circumstances in which the GATB
is used.
II. Constitutional Analysis of Race-Conscious
Employment Decisions
In 1986, the Department of Justice challenged the practice of race-
44. Id. at 2.
45. Id. at 5. Many of the objections to race norming are based on the assumption that the
GATB has high validities for job performance, yet this is not actually the case. See infra notes
143-161 and accompanying text.
46. FAmNEss, supra note 23, at 8.
47. See id. at 6-8.
48. Id. at 7. The authors of the report also noted that "[t]his outcome is at odds with the
nation's express commitment to equal employment opportunity for minority workers." Id.
49. See id. at 6-8.
50. Id. See infra part II.B.2 for a complete discussion on the problem of selection errors.
51. These challenges would be based on Title VII grounds because they would likely fail
on constitutional grounds. See infra part II.B.I for an analysis of the constitutionality of the
GATB without race norming.
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norming GATB results on a reverse discrimination theory.5 2 The D.O.J.
viewed race norming as unconstitutional because it classifies job seekers
by race or national origin, and the preferential treatment of some to the
disadvantage of others constitutes intentional racial discrimination. 3
The dispute over the legality of race norming underscores a larger debate
over the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause in the context of affirm-
ative action.
One view of equal protection is that racial preferences such as race
norming violate an individual's right to be free from discrimination. 4
The countervailing view holds that in order to promote equal employ-
ment opportunity and avoid discrimination against minority group mem-
bers, race-conscious policies which may favor minority group rights over
an individual's rights are often necessary to protect against discrimina-
tion.5 5 The authors of the Fairness in Employment Testing report pos-
ited a group rights interpretation of equal protection as part of the legal
justification for race norming5 6 Both the individual rights and the group
rights interpretation of equal protection have found support in Supreme
Court decisions.5 7
The fate of the attempts at race-norming employment tests provides
an informative guide to how other race-conscious measures might fare
under a constitutional or a Title VII challenge. A current example high-
lights the constitutional and Title VII issues surrounding race norming
and employment tests. As of January 1992, the City of Chicago ordered
a freeze on promotions because the results of the most recent police pro-
52. The challenge was brought by William Bradford Reynolds, then Assistant Attorney
General for Civil Rights. FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 21.
53. Id.
54. This view is known as the nondiscrimination principle, which advocates a colorblind
approach to equal protection. It was the view of equal protection advocated by the D.OJ.
throughout the Reagan and Bush administrations. See generally William B. Reynolds, Indi-
vidualism vs. Group Rights: The Legacy of Brown, 93 YALE L.J. 995 (1984) (arguing that the
true concern of equal protection is to protect individual, not group, rights, and that racial
classifications should not be tolerated because they are morally wrong). See also infra notes
166-173 and accompanying text for a discussion of colorblind doctrine.
55. According to Owen Fiss, the Equal Protection Clause can only be interpreted in terms
of group protection, and it confers protection on individuals only by reason of their member-
ship in groups. Burke Marshall, A Comment on the Nondiscrimination Principle in a "Nation
of Minorities," 93 YALE L.J. 1006, 1007 (1984) (discussing Owen Fiss, Groups and the Equal
Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. Axm. 107 (1976)). Marshall argues that when the discrimi-
nation is against a people, the remedy must "correct and cure and compensate for the discrimi-
nation against the people and not just the discrimination against the identifiable persons."
Marshall, supra, at 1006. Marshall was Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights during
the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 36.
56. FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 21-22. The scientific justification for race norming is
based on selection errors that unduly burden minority test-takers. See infra notes 143-161 and
accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (individual
rights) and Brown v. Board of Educ., 374 U.S. 483 (1954) (group rights).
motion exam-given in 1988-had been adjusted by race norming.55 In
order to adhere to the 1991 Civil Rights Act the city can no longer race-
norm results of promotion exams. To ensure that qualified minority can-
didates are offered promotions, the city must now examine its options,
including giving a new promotion exam, adjusting the old exam, or elimi-
nating exam-based promotions.59
Because some promotions have already been made as a result of
race-norming the 1988 exam, there are several challenges that could
arise. First, white officers not promoted while race norming was in effect
could claim reverse discrimination and constitutionally challenge the ear-
lier promotions. 6 Second, if the City of Chicago adjusts the old exam,
using a race-conscious method other than race norming, white applicants
could challenge current promotions on a reverse discrimination theory.
Finally, if the city promotes from the old exam without utilizing race-
conscious measures, or if it gives a new exam that has a discriminatory
impact on minorities, minorities could sue for a Title VII violation under
a disparate impact theory. These dilemmas will serve as a basis for com-
parison for both constitutional and Title VII analysis of race norming
and other race-conscious measures used in conjunction with employment
tests.
A. Equal Protection Applied to Race Norming and the GATB
L Race Norming's Constitutionality Under Strict Scrutiny
The starting point for evaluating the constitutionality of race norm-
ing is Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.61 Allan Bakke, a
white male who had been denied admission to the medical school at the
University of California at Davis for two consecutive years, challenged
the medical school's special admissions program for minorities which re-
served sixteen places for minorities in each year's entering class. Bakke
contended that the program excluded him from the school on the basis of
his race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.62
Justice Powell announced the plurality judgment for the Court, ap-
58. Laurie Goering, Rights Law Delays Cop Promotions, CHI. TRia., Jan. 5, 1992, at 3.
59. Id.
60. This could be a real possibility even though the City of Chicago believes that the
earlier promotions are not problematic. See Goering, supra note 58 (reporting that mayor's
press secretary doubts earlier promotions would create a problem).
61. 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion).
62. Id. at 277-78. Bakke also alleged that the special admissions program was invalid
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id at 270. The special admissions program
was based on whether an applicant checked a box for minority group consideration on the
admissions application. The applicant would then be referred to a special admissions commit-
tee and was not compared to general applicants. Id. at 274-75.
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plying strict scrutiny to the Davis admissions program. 6 Although Jus-
tice Powell found that the goal of achieving a diverse student body was a
sufficiently compelling interest warranting the consideration of race,64 he
concluded that the special admissions program was not necessary to at-
tain that goal.65 While Justice Powell agreed with Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, and Blackmun that race may be taken into account in
an admissions program as one factor,66 he expressed concern that reserv-
ing a fixed number of seats would preclude applicants from being treated
as individuals in the admissions process. 67
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke reflects the view that the Equal
Protection Clause protects individuals by allowing the government to
adopt racial preferences, but only for the purpose of remedying particu-
larized unlawful discrimination. 68 Justice Powell stated:
[This Court has] never approved a [racial] classification that aids
persons perceived as members of relatively victimized groups at the
expense of other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial,
legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory
violations.... Without such findings ... it cannot be said that the
government has any greater interest in helping one individual than
in refraining from harming another.6 9
Justice Powell's approach to racial classifications was not com-
pletely colorblind; he would have upheld racial classifications that fur-
thered a legitimate and substantial government interest.70 For Justice
Powell, a racial preference designed solely to remedy "societal discrimi-
nation" did not advance a constitutionally legitimate government pur-
pose.71 The Court in Bakke established that strict scrutiny would be
applied to reverse discrimination based on race, but did not identify
which legitimate government interests it might find sufficiently compel-
ling to justify discrimination.
The Court revisited the government interest issue in Wygant v. Jack-
son Board of Education.72  Wygant involved a labor agreement designed
to preserve an affirmative hiring policy to increase the number of minor-
63. Id. at 305.
64. Id. at 311-12.
65. Id. at 315-20.
66. Id. at 296 n.36.
67. Id. at 318.
68. See Robert J. Delahunty, Perspectives on Within-Group Scoring, 33 J. VOCATIONAL
BEHAV. 463, 464 (1988). Delahunty was an attorney in the Appellate Section, Civil Rights
Division, U.S. Department of Justice. Id. at 463.
69. 438 U.S. at 307-09 (Powell, J.).
70. Id. at 307. Powell identifies at least two constitutionally permissible racial classifica-
tion goals: eliminating or ameliorating the disabling effects of identified discrimination, id.,
and attaining a diverse student body. Id at 312.
71. 438 U.S. at 310.
72. 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (plurality opinion).
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ity teachers in a school system. A provision of the labor agreement pro-
vided that if layoffs became necessary, teachers with the most seniority
would be retained, except where it would result in minority teachers be-
ing laid off in a greater percentage than the current percentage of minor-
ity teachers employed at the time of the layoff. The effect of this
provision was that minority teachers with less seniority were retained
while white teachers with more seniority were laid off.7" A plurality led
by Justice Powell concluded that in the context of affirmative action, so-
cietal discrimination alone was not sufficient to justify the use of a racial
classification. 74 The plurality required that the school district put for-
ward sufficient evidence to conclude that there had been prior discrimi-
nation by the school district itself.
75
Through Bakke and Wygant, the Court firmly established that an
affirmative action plan must be directed at remedying specific prior dis-
crimination to survive strict scrutiny. When the U.S.E.S. implemented
race norming, however, it was not combatting specific instances of past
discrimination.76 The referral program's goal was to ensure that referrals
of minorities were in proportion to the number of minorities in the regis-
trant pool, thereby helping to foster a racially balanced workforce.77 Ab-
sent evidence of past discrimination against individual minority
applicants, the goal of achieving a racially balanced workforce was likely
based on the desire to ameliorate societal discrimination. Yet without a
showing of specific discrimination or some other constitutionally permis-
sible purpose, the Supreme Court has never found the pursuit of racial
balance for its own sake to be a constitutionally valid purpose.78
Under Bakke and Wygant, the City of Chicago would similarly have
to establish that it was combatting specific instances of past discrimina-
tion in order to justify its prior use of race norming if white police officers
who took the 1988 promotion exam challenged prior promotions based
on race-normed test results. Even if the city could establish this past
discrimination, white officers would most likely prevail because race
norming would not be found by the Court to be a legitimate means to
remedy past discrimination.
73. Id. at 270.
74. Id. at 276 ("Societal discrimination, without more, is too amorphous a basis for im-
posing a racially classified remedy."). Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor in this part of the opinion.
75. Id. at 277.
76. This was the position taken by the D.O.J. Delahunty, supra note 68, at 465. The
D.O.J.'s analysis of the constitutionality of race norming was written before Richmond v. J. A.
Crason Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (plurality opinion) and Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. F CC., 497
U.S. 547 (1990) were decided. See infra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
77. Delahunty, supra note 68, at 465.
78. See, eg., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307 (Powell, J.) ("Preferring members of any one group
for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake. This the
Constitution forbids."); Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276 (phlrality opinion).
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In addition to noting that ameliorating societal discrimination was
not a compelling government interest, Justice Powell concluded that
strict scrutiny should be applied to race-conscious measures?.9  When
there is a compelling state interest to justify a race-conscious measure,
the means chosen to achieve this purpose must be narrowly tailored.80
This narrow means-end relationship requires that the race-conscious ap-
proach be minimally intrusive and not unduly burden innocent parties.81
A race-conscious remedial measure is acceptable where the burden
shouldered by innocent-usually non-minoity-parties is relatively
light, but is unacceptable if it imposes a heavy or intrusive burden on
innocent parties.82 In articulating this distinction, Justice Powell differ-
entiated between the identifiable, intrusive injury imposed by the layoffs
in Wygant and valid hiring practices where the burden is diffused among
society generally. 3
For the white Chicago police officers, race norming would be con-
sidered preferential treatment that heavily burdens innocent parties
whose scores are not converted.84 Even with valid hiring goals in place,
the burden of race norming would not be diffused throughout society
generally; rather, identifiable police officers waiting for promotion would
be burdened by this practice. 5 Additionally, white police officers could
allege that race norming is not narrowly tailored to the city's purpose.
Race norming would violate Bakke by "shield[ing] registrants in the pre-
ferred groups from comparison with registrants from other
79. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280 (Powell, J.).
80. Id. at 279-80.
81. Id. at 281.
82. See id. at 280-83. Justice Powell was joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn-
quist in this part of the opinion. As noted in Wygant, this view has been upheld in Fulliove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980); Franks v. Bowman, 424 U.S. 747, 777 (1976); and Steel-
workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979). Wygant, 476 U.S. at 281-82.
83. 476 U.S. at 282-83. Professor Michel Rosenfeld has argued that this distinction is not
well grounded:
Preferential treatment in hiring does not have primarily a diffuse effect on society at
large, but rather definite sharply defined negative consequences for a small number of
individuals: the applicants who would have succeeded in their objective but for the
preferential treatment accorded to certain other applicants.... [T]he injury to inno-
cent third parties attributable to preferential hiring seems as sharply concentrated on
a small number of individuals as is that stemming from preferential layoffs.
MICHEL ROSENFELD, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND JUSTICE: A PHILOSOPHICAL AND CON-
STITUTIONAL INQUIRY 181-82 (1991).
However, even if Professor Rosenfeld's analysis is accurate, it does not adequately ac-
count for the difficulty of determining which specific individuals were harmed by preferential
hiring. In Wygant, the individuals affected by the layoffs could be specifically identified.
84. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 280-83.
85. If a case were brought challenging the race-norming of the GATB, this argument
would probably fail. The burden from race-norming the GATB would be broadly diffused
amongst society given the large number of applicants referred to many different job categories.
backgrounds." 6
The city may have other alternatives that arguably would be less
burdensome on innocent parties, such as "banding, 87 eliminating exam-
based promotions,18 or considering race as only one factor in a deci-
sion.89 Alternatively the U.S.E.S. could provide remedial training to low
scorers or allow low scorers to retake the test.90
After Bakke and Wygant, the question remained whether there was
another compelling interest, aside from remedying identifiable past dis-
crimination, that would enable racial preferences to survive strict scru-
tiny.91 In the case of state and local government programs, the Court
answered this question in the negative in City ofRichmond v. JA. Croson
Co. 92 Croson involved a Richmond, Virginia city ordinance that required
city construction contracts held by non-minority owned prime contrac-
tors to set aside at least thirty percent of the work for minority subcon-
tractors. 93 Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion stated that under the
Equal Protection Clause, racial classifications are subject to a strict scru-
tiny standard not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefitted
by the classification.
94
Applied to the example of the Chicago police officers, Croson shifts
the burden of proof to the City of Chicago to adequately justify its reme-
dial program. In order to prove a compelling interest in remedying past
discrimination, the city must show strong and specific evidence of past
discrimination by the police department itself.95 For the state employ-
ment agencies that race-normed GATB results, this burden of proof
86. See Delahunty, supra note 68, at 467. This was the position taken by the Reagan
administration. Id at 463. See also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-
19 (1978) (plurality opinion) ("[R]ace or ethnic background may be deemed a 'plus' in a par-
ticular applicant's file, [but it is impermissible to] insulate the individual from comparison with
all other candidates.").
87. Bridgeport Guardians v. City of Bridgeport, 735 F. Supp. 1126, 1136-37 (D. Conn.
1990), afftd, 933 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1991). "Banding" is a technique that groups together a
range of test scores which are statistically without significant difference and which then pro-
vides for employee selection from a band range, allowing for the consideration of additional
factors such as race, gender, work experience and dependability. See infra notes 197-200 and
accompanying text.
88. This is a possibility currently under consideration by the City of Chicago. Goering,
supra note 58, at 3.
89. See, eg., Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-17 (discussing Harvard admissions plan).
90. See Delahunty, supra note 68, at 467 n.10.
91. See, eg., Bakke, 438 US. at 311-12 (attaining a diverse student body was a permissi-
ble purpose).
92. 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 (1989) (plurality opinion). "Classifications based on race carry a
danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in
fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility." Id. at 493
(O'Connor, J.).
93. Croson, 488 U.S. at 477.
94. Id. at 493-94.
95. Id. at 504.
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would likely be insurmountable; given the large number of applicants
referred to many different job categories, it would be a daunting-per-
haps impossible-task to prove past discrimination within specific job
categories.
2. Race Norming's Constitutionality Under Intermediate Scrutiny
The Court in Croson made a distinction between federal and state
race-conscious policies, stating that federal race-conscious decisions
should receive more deference than those instituted by state or local gov-
ernments. 6 Justice O'Connor stated: "Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is an explicit constraint on state power, and the States must
undertake any remedial efforts in accordance with that provision," '97
whereas section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a "'positive grant of
legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in deter-
mining whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment.' "I' Subsequently, the Court, led by Jus-
tice Brennan, applied only intermediate scrutiny to a federal race-con-
scious policy in Metro Broadcasting v. F. C. C.99 The policies at issue in
Metro Broadcasting were the Federal Communications Commission's
(F.C.C.) minority preference policies awarding enhancements for minor-
ity ownership and permitting "distress sale" radio and television stations
to be transferred only to minority-controlled firms."°
In Metro Broadcasting, the Court held that a congressionally man-
dated racial preference does not violate equal protection as long as there
is only a slight burden on non-minorities and there is a substantial rela-
tionship to achieving an important governmental interest.010 The Court
considered promoting broadcast diversity to be a legitimate government
interest that justified minority preference policies.'0 2
Upon delineating an intermediate scrutiny standard of review, Jus-
tice Brennan reiterated the Court's holding in Fullilove v. Klutznick
10 3
96. Id at 490-91.
97. Id. at 490.
98. Id. (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966)).
99. 497 U.S. 547, 634, reh'g denied, 497 U.S. 1050 (1990).
100. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 552. The "enhancement" awarded is to minority
applicants for new radio or television broadcast licenses. Upon considering new applicants, in
addition to analyzing factors including proposed program service, past broadcast record, and
efficient use of the frequency, the F.C.C. awards a plus to minority owners who actively par-
ticipate in daily operations. Additionally, the F.C.C.'s general "distress sale" policy is that a
licensee in danger of losing a broadcast license cannot assign or transfer the license until the
F.C.C. conducts a hearing. The F.C.C.'s minority preference policy for distress sale licenses
allows such a license to be assigned to an F.C.C.-approved minority enterprise. Id. at 557.
101. Id at 596-97.
102. Id. at 567.
103. 448 U.S. 448 (1980). At issue in Fullilove was a congressionally mandated set-aside
program.
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and distinguished Metro Broadcasting from Croson. Brennan noted that
"much of the language and reasoning in Croson reaffirmed the lesson of
Fulilove that race-conscious classifications adopted by Congress to ad-
dress racial and ethnic discrimination are subject to a different standard
than such classifications prescribed by state and local governments."'"
Brennan also noted that Congress' power to employ a race-conscious
measure rests not only on section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment but
also on Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, the Spending
Clause, and the Civil War Amendments.105
The intermediate scrutiny standard of review in Metro Broadcasting
would not apply to the City of Chicago in its defense against white chal-
lengers because the city's actions have no federal involvement or man-
date. This issue is less clear in the case of race-norming the GATB.
Race norming was advocated by a federal agency-the United States
Employment Service-but implemented by independent state employ-
ment agencies.10 6 If the Court found state employment agencies inde-
pendently responsible for race-norming the GATB, race norming would
fail under Croson as noted above. If the Court found the U.S.E.S. re-
sponsible for race-norming the GATB, then it would analyze race norm-
ing under intermediate scrutiny as expressed in Metro Broadcasting. The
U.S.E.S., as a federal agency, would have an opportunity to present an
important government interest beyond remedying societal discrimina-
tion. The 1972 D.O.L. referral policy, which explicitly stated that "refer-
rals of tested minority applicants should be in proportion to their
presence in the applicant pool,"'1 7 would likely be interpreted as evi-
dence that race norming was an attempt to remedy societal discrimina-
tion; without some other important government interest, race norming
would be invalidated even under intermediate scrutiny.
In the example of Chicago police promotions, white officers chal-
lenging past race norming would have prevailed based on the above anal-
ysis. A non-minority challenge brought against race norming of the
GATB would also prevail. If the GATB were now to be utilized as a
referral tool without race norming or other race-conscious measures, it
would have a disparate impact on minority referrals to public and private
employers. The issue becomes whether a minority test-taker's challenge
to the disparate impact of the GATB would fail on equal protection
grounds.
3. The Constitutionality of the GA TBs Use Without Race Norming
The disparate impact of the GATB on minority test-takers is com-
104. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 565.
105. Id. at 563-64 & n.ll.
106. See supra note 23, and accompanying text.
107. FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 21-22.
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parable to that of the employment test at issue in Washington v. Davis.108
At issue in Davis was a written employment test for entry-level police
officer positions in the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Depart-
ment.109 The test was designed to measure verbal "ability, vocabulary,
reading and comprehension."' 1 0 Black applicants failed the test four
times as frequently as white applicants.I1 The Supreme Court held that
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is not vio-
lated unless an intent to discriminate can be shown." 2 Disproportionate
racial impact alone does not render an employment test unconstitutional
because disproportionate racial impact is not sufficient, by itself, to prove
a discriminatory purpose."
3
Because disproportionate impact alone is not sufficient to invalidate
use of a test, the decisive issue in Davis became whether or not the test
was a valid indicator of job performance." 4 The Court was satisfied that
there was a "positive relationship""'  between performance on the test
and actual performance as a police officer." 6 Not only was the test
found to be neutral on its face and rationally related to "a purpose the
Government [was] constitutionally empowered to pursue,""' 7 but the
Court also found the affirmative efforts by the Metropolitan Police De-
partment "to recruit black officers," and "the changing racial composi-
tion of the recruit classes and of the force in general" negated any
inference of racial discrimination."
8
Under the Davis analysis, the use of the GATB without race-norm-
ing test scores would most likely be upheld under an equal protection
analysis." 9 If the test results of the GATB were presented in rank or-
der,'2 0 there would be a disproportionate number of minorities adversely
affected by the use of the test.' 21 Yet the GATB is discriminatory only in
108. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
109. Id. at 232.
110. Id. at 235 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 348 F. Supp. 15, 16 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
111. Id. at 237.
112. Id. at 240 ("[T]he invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose.").
113. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242 ("Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the
sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.").
114. Davis, 426 U.S. at 247.
115. Id. at 250.
116. Id.
117. Id at 246.
118. Id.
119. Once an employment test is deemed valid by the Court, the constitutional analysis
would then follow strict or intermediate scrutiny as outlined above.
120. Rank ordering of test scores would simply be top-down listing by raw scores of all
test-takers combined.
121. FAiRNESS, supra note 23, at 21.
its impact;12 2 there is no "racially motivated government actor" 123 that
would make the test invalid. 124 The test has been found to have modest
validities 125 when correlated with job performance.126 The N.R.C. deter-
mined that GATB scores do not systematically underestimate minority
job performance. 127 Additionally, the fact that the U.S.E.S. is now mak-
ing other affirmative efforts to attain a racially balanced workforce
121
would weigh in favor of the GATB's constitutionality. The Employment
Services' use of the test is likely to be constitutionally permissible under
this equal protection analysis. Similarly, if no intent to discriminate is
shown, under Washington v. Davis, the minority police officers in Chi-
cago would have to prove either that the promotion exam results do not
correlate with job performance or that the exam is racially biased on its
face in order to prevail.
B. Title VII Applied to Race Norming and the GATB
Both minority and non-minority plaintiffs could challenge the dis-
criminatory impact of race norming or of an employment test under Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. 129 Since non-minority plaintiffs would
122. See id. at 115 (stating that while there appears to be no bias in item content, there is
minimal evidence on which to decide whether the items in the GATB are biased against mi-
norities; additionally, the test could have an overall bias).
123. See TRIBE, infra note 171, § 16-20 (detailing the doctrine of discriminatory purpose
and Washington v. Davis).
124. On the contrary, it is evident that the D.O.L. is sensitive to the potential disparate
impact; within-group score adjustments was its initial response to combat the problem. FAIR-
NESS, supra note 23, at 21 (One policy sought to be furthered by race norming was "the pro-
motion of federal equal employment opportunity and affirmative action goals.").
125. These modest validities are mainly derived from supervisor ratings of job perform-
ance. See FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 169.
126. While the Court in Davis found that modest validities were acceptable, it is this issue
which could be successfully challenged under a Title VII analysis. See infra part II.B.2.
127. See FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 188. This conclusion is uncertain at best because it is
based on supervisor ratings of performance. The N.R.C. could not adequately factor out the
inherent bias in supervisor performance evaluations. See id. at 185-87.
128. For example, the D.O.L. is advising that results from the GATB should be used in
conjunction with other selection criteria such as education, training, experience, and personal
interviews. It is likely that many states will no longer use the test for referral at all, but will
instead use it as a tool for assessment and counseling. See Holmes, supra note 10, at 47.
129. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2000e-17 (1964). Section 703(b) states:
[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employment agency to fail or
refuse to refer for employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual
because of his race, color, ... or national origin, or to classify or refer for employ-
ment any individual on the basis of his race, color ... or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b). Section 703(j) states that an employer or employment agency is not
required
to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group because of the race,
color,... or national origin of such individual or group on account of an imbalance
which may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons of any
race, color,... or national origin ... referred or classified for employment by any
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most likely prevail on a constitutional challenge to the practice of race-
norming employment test results, they would also prevail under a Title
VII analysis. The only avenue available to minority plaintiffs, however,
would be to challenge use of the GATB without race-conscious measures
on a discriminatory impact theory.
L Race Norming's Validity Under Title VII
Although an employment test that can be shown to have a disparate
impact on minority hiring may not be held unconstitutional under a
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act may invalidate the test despite the absence of discrimi-
natory intent.130 Even if the test itself were invalidated, however, the
practice of race-norming test results would not be an allowable remedy to
correct the invalid test. In cases in which the Court has found disparate
impact, the tests in controversy have usually been "addressed to achiev-
ing the statutory objective of eliminating discriminatory selection proce-
dures, not at securing the substantive outcome of group parity in the
workforce."
131
As with the constitutional analysis, the issue in a Title VII analysis
is whether Title VII was designed to protect individual or group rights.
In Connecticut v. Teal,132 an employer sought to offset the adverse im-
pact of a written test on minority job applicants by including additional
selection devices in order to achieve racial balance at the position of su-
pervisor. 13 3 The Teal decision emphasized that Title VII's objective is
"the protection of the individual employee, rather than the protection of
the minority group as a whole."1 34 Thus, attempting to achieve a racially
balanced workforce could not justify an employer's race-conscious meas-
ures.1 35 The race-norming approach would therefore fail under the Teal
Title VII analysis because race norming acts as a device to ensure bot-
tom-line racial balance.
136
employment agency ... in comparison with the total number or percentage of per-
sons of such race, color, ... or national origin... in the available work force in any
community....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).
130. Davis, 426 U.S. at 246-47.
131. Delahunty, supra note 68, at 468.
132. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
133. Id. at 444 (selection devices included evaluations of past work performance, supervi-
sor recommendations, and seniority).
134. Id. at 453-54.
135. Id. at 456. The Court reiterated this position in Local 28, Sheet Metal Workers, Int'l
Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 475 (1986) (plurality opinion) ("[R]ace-conscious affirmative
measures [may] not be involved simply to create a racially balanced work force.").
136. See Delahunty, supra note 68, at 470-71.
2 GATB's Validity Under Title VII
Although the court in Washington v. Davis required proof of dis-
criminatory intent to strike a hiring practice on constitutional grounds, it
also concluded that Title VII could invalidate a test without a showing of
discriminatory intent. 13 7 The factors to be examined under Title VII
would be the same as under equal protection analysis, but the Davis
Court observed that under Title VII the review of these factors would be
more rigorous than under equal protection analysis. 138 This rigorous re-
view would be dictated by standards of review already in practice at the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (E.E.O.C.). 139  The
E.E.O.C., which administers Title VII on behalf of the federal govern-
ment, relies on standards developed by the American Psychological As-
sociation to accurately validate employment tests and the tests'
relationship to job performance. 4 ° These standards require an employ-
ment test to meet a higher standard than the "rational relationship to a
legitimate purpose" mandated by the Supreme Court's interpretation of
equal protection.
141
A Title VII analysis of the GATB as a job referral tool without
additional race-conscious measures being employed could invalidate use
of the test. Although the N.R.C. found "modest" validities for the
GATB, 42 this finding can be challenged on at least three grounds.
First, the modest validities observed by the N.R.C. were based on
supervisor ratings of job performance. 14 3 Supervisor ratings are an "ob-
served rating" of job performance, determined by a supervisor under
work conditions. 144 Psychological literature has demonstrated that su-
pervisor ratings tend to be imperfect indicators of job performance. 45
The N.R.C. found evidence that "supervisors tend to rate employees of
their own race higher than they rate employees of another race," 14 6 and
the supervisors in these studies were primarily white.1 47 Because the pre-
cise magnitude of the tendency to underrate employees of another race is
137. 426 U.S. at 246-47.
138. Id. at 247. Washington v. Davis was not decided under Title VII because the case was
brought before the 1972 amendments to Title VII were made applicable to public employers.
See FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 44.
139. Davis, 426 U.S. at 247 n.13.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 247.
142. FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 169.
143. Id. Validities are also based on success in training programs, but supervisor ratings
were the primary performance measure used. Id. at 6.
144. Id. at 128-29. An "observed rating" can be contrasted with a "true rating" of a
worker, which would be measured by an exhaustive study of that worker's job performance.
Id.
145. Id. at 185.
146. FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 188.
147. Id. at 6.
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unknown,14 this subjective factor weakens the overall conclusion that
there is a modest correlation between the GATB scores and subsequent
job performance.
The second weakness in the GATB validity claims is the problem of
"speededness" of the test. The time limits on the GATB subtests are
extremely short. 4 9 There is evidence that a test which measures depth of
a certain ability for one racial group may only be measuring a speed abil-
ity for another group.' 50 This difference is best demonstrated by the ex-
ample of form matching:
[F]orm matchingf requires examinees to pair elements of two
large sets of variously shaped two-dimensional line drawings. A
total of 60 items is to be completed in 6 minutes. Within this time,
examinees must not only find pairs of line drawings that are identi-
cal in size and shape, but must then find and darken the correct
answer bubble ... from a set of 10 answer bubbles with labels
consisting of single or double capitalized letters (e.g., GG). The
labeling of physically corresponding answer bubbles differs from
one item to the next. Since the subtest is tightly timed, identifica-
tion of the correct answer bubble from the relatively long list
presented on the answer sheet might become a significant compo-
nent of the skill assessed.... [T]he subtest measures not only form
perception, but also the speed of list processing and skill in decod-
ing complex answer sheet formats. The latter skill is dependent on
previous experience with tests. 5'
The extent of previous experience with tests differs for members of differ-
ent racial or ethnic groups, with minority examinees being the least ex-
perienced with standardized tests. 52 The speed component of the test
makes it probable that the test does not assess the abilities of members of
different racial or ethnic groups in the same way.153 The N.R.C. con-
cluded that the "speededness" of the test could have an effect on the
predictive validity of the GATB across racial or ethnic groups.
15 4
Finally, and most significantly, there is the problem of "selection
errors."15 The term "selection errors" refers to the concepts of false-
acceptance and false-rejection based on test results. An example of false-
acceptance is a test-taker who scores high on a test but does not perform
successfully at work. Conversely, false-rejection occurs when a test-taker
who can perform successfully at work is screened out of job referral be-
148. Id. at 188.
149. Id. at 103.
150. Id. at 105-06.
151. FAIRNESS, supra at 106 (emphasis added).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 105.
154. Ia at 115.
155. See id. at 6-8.
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cause of a low score.'" 6 While high GATB scores have modest validities
for predicting successful job performance, 5 7 low GATB scores do not
correlate with poor job performance. Low scores are not reliable
predictors of job success or failure. In focusing on selection error, the
authors of the N.R.C. report highlighted a fundamental aspect of testing
fairness: "Do workers of equal job proficiency in the several groups have
the same chance of selection?"'5 8 A fundamental flaw of the GATB is
that minorities who could perform well on the job but who score in the
lower ranges on the test are screened out in disproportionate numbers
because minority groups have lower average test scores. 159
The problems of potential bias in supervisor ratings, the speed com-
ponent of the GATB favoring white applicants over minority applicants,
and selection errors screening out a disproportionate number of minori-
ties would support a claim that use of the GATB is an invalid employ-
ment practice under Title VII.' °
Minority police officers in Chicago may be able to make a similar
Title VII claim regarding the 1988 promotional exam; however, this ap-
pears premature in mid-1993 given that Chicago is already studying ways
to combat discriminatory impact of promotional procedures.' 61
I. Proposals for Race-Conscious Measures
A. Constitutional Support for Race-Conscious Measures
Although the Court has narrowed its equal protection approach to
affirmative action through Wygant and Croson, it has not completely re-
jected race-conscious policies. The Court's support for preferential treat-
ment began with Brown v. Board of Education.'62 In the context of
affirmative action, Brown stands for the proposition that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause is meant to protect group rights.'63 The basis for this ar-
gument is derived from examining the remedy in Brown. Although
Linda Brown'" herself was to receive the individual remedy of attend-
ance at an integrated school, the dismantling of a dual school system
156. Id. at 255-58.
157. I at 169.
158. Id. at 255.
159. See FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 255-58. Focusing on the right of each individual to
receive meritocratic treatment, Professor Mark Kelman questions "the propriety of using
screening devices with racially disparate impact in screening workers who are in fact of equal
quality." Mark Kelman, The Problem of False Negatives, 27:3 Soc'y at 21, 23 (1990).
160. See Jan H. Blits & Linda S. Gottfredson, Equality or Lasting Inequality?; Mary L.
Tenopyr, Fairness in Employment Testing, 27:3 Soc'y at 4, 17 (1990) for critiques of the FAIR-
NESS report.
161. See Goering, supra note 58, at 3.
162. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1).
163. See Marshall, supra note 55, at 1007-08.
164. Linda Brown was the named plaintiff in the case.
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conferred constitutional benefits on everyone in the system; desegrega-
tion was a group remedy. 6 '
The distinction between group rights and individual rights becomes
paramount when attempting to reconcile racial preferences with the no-
tion of a colorblind constitution.'66 The colorblind constitutional theory
posits that all individuals should be treated equally under the law. 67
This doctrine reflects the philosophical underpinnings of the meritocratic
ideal, according to which individual talent is the only fair criterion to
determine the allocation of scarce social resources.'
68
Justice O'Connor articulated this meritocratic vision in her Metro
Broadcasting dissent: "Racial classifications, whether providing benefits
to or burdening particular racial or ethnic groups, may stigmatize those
groups singled out for different treatment and may create considerable
tension with the Nation's widely shared commitment to evaluating indi-
viduals upon their individual merit."' 69 According to Justice O'Connor,
the prohibition of the use of racial classifications is a central constitu-
tional norm.'7 0 After Croson and Metro Broadcasting, it appeared that at
least five Justices believe colorblindness, in a state action context, should
be the animating vision for antidiscrimination law.' 7 '
165. Id. at 1007-10. Marshall points out that the burdens of desegregation were borne by
state institutions, not individuals. Id. at 1008. He then goes on to say, however, that for the
purposes of constitutional analysis, it should not matter whether it is an institution or an
individual who bears the burden of affirmative action. Id. at 1009-10. While Marshall is cor-
rect that the question of who bears the burden should not be the primary concern in an equal
protection analysis, he fails to account for the current public backlash against racial prefer-
ences. As stated by another commentator, it is doubtful that "racial preferences and quotas
can ever be made acceptable to the vast majority of the American people." Lino A. Graglia,
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: From Prohibiting to Requiring Racial Discrimination
in Employment, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 68, 76 (1991).
166. The elder Justice Harlan was the first to state that "[o]ur Constitution is color-blind."
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting). This quote has been the
foundation of the colorblind doctrine, yet, as noted by Professor Tribe, Justice Harlan was
referring only to the concept that the Fourteenth Amendment prevents the law from enshrin-
ing and perpetuating white supremacy. Laurence H. Tribe, In What Vision of the Constitution
Must the Law be Color-blind?, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 201, 203 (1986) [hereinafter Tribe,
Vision].
167. All the justices seem to share the idea that the ultimate fulfillment of constitutional
equality would be evidenced by a truly colorblind society, but they divide on what types of
race-conscious remedies are legitimate. ROSENPELD, supra note 83, at 206-07 (discussing
Croson).
168. See FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 35.
169. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 604 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
170. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case for Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1077 (1991).
171. Id. The Justices who appeared to favor a colorblind approach after Croson and Metro
Broadcasting were Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, White, and Chief Justice Rehnquist.
Id. at 1077 n.82; Croson, 488 U.S. at 493-94. See also Tamar Fruchtman, Comment, City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: Charting a Course Through the Supreme Court's Affirmative
Action Decisions, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 699, 715-20 (1990) (discussing the Justices' views
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Yet, the Court has consistently refused to categorically embrace a
colorblind approach.172 Constitutional prohibitions against racial prefer-
ences have not amounted to strict prohibitions against remedies that take
account of race.
173
Additionally, preferential treatment outside of the affirmative action
context is not novel. Preferential treatment is granted to homeowners in
the form of an income tax write-off of mortgage interest; veterans receive
preferential treatment in several areas; and even water rights and agricul-
tural subsidies are forms of preference.174 As noted by Professor Brest:
[I]t is frustrating and painful, even if we are not stigmatized or the
objects of prejudice, to be classified and disadvantaged based on
characteristics beyond our control. Yet there are many areas be-
sides race and sex and the traditional suspect-type classifications
where this happens to us all the time and we are willing to accept
it.
175
The Supreme Court has treated racial preferences more leniently
under Title VII than under the Equal Protection Clause. 176 Yet the lan-
guage of the Equal Protection Clause is more abstract and open-ended
than the specific prohibitions presented by Title VII. 177 While the Equal
Protection Clause could allow for more flexibility, the Justices have
hemmed themselves in with the colorblind doctrine. Race norming was
designed to remedy the adverse impact of a testing procedure that is ar-
guably not a good enough predictor of job performance. "If the Court
perceives a need to remedy employment discrimination that outweighs
the potential for 'trammeling' the interests of non-minorities, the remedy
is permissible."
1 78
on affirmative action). Justice Thomas's record before his appointment to the Court indicates
that he too would favor a colorblind approach to affirmative action. Even with Justice White's
imminent retirement there are still five Justices who would most likely take a colorblind
approach.
172. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §§ 16-20, 16-21 (2d
ed. 1988). While the Court finds that colorblindness should be an animating vision, this does
not mean that it will be a categorical approach to affirmative action in the future.
173. George Rutherglen & Daniel R. Ortiz, Affirmative Action Under the Constitution and
Title VII From Confusionto Convergence, 35 UCLA L. REv. 467, 517 (1988).
174. See FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 37-38 (citing Abraham Edel, Preferential Considera-
tion and Justice, in SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT: WOMEN AND RACIAL
MINORITIES IN EDUCATION AND BUSINESS 111-133 (William T. Blackstone & Robert D. Hes-
lep, eds. 1977)).
175. Paul Brest, Affirmative Action and the Constitution: Three Theories, 72 IOWA L. REV.
281, 284 (1987) (discussing three general constitutional theories for analyzing racial classifica-
tions: original intent, protection of discrete and insular minorities, and colorblind doctrine).
176. See Rutherglen & Ortiz, supra note 173, at 483-90.
177. Id. Rutherglen & Ortiz propose that the Supreme Court bring uniformity to its af-
firmative action decisions by converging the Title VII and constitutional standards for analyz-
ing racial preferences. Id. at 517-18.
178. J. Hoult Verkerke, Note, Compensating Victims of Preferential Employment Discrimi-
nation Remedies, 98 YALE L.J. 1479, 1479-80 (1989).
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One constitutional justification for a racial preference that may bur-
den an innocent non-minority is Professor Tribe's "antisubjugation prin-
ciple."'7 9  According to the antisubjugation principle, government
actions should be judged by their impact on members of protected
groups, not on the basis of the motives of identifiable bad actors. The
problems of inequality operate at the systemic level and cannot be
changed simply by legislating against discrimination."' 0
Finally, the Court has approved racial preferences in the Title VII
context. The assertion that Title VII was devised to protect individual,
not group, rights"" is arguably apparent from the language of Title VII
explicitly protecting an individual from discrimination."8 2 Although Ti-
tle VII may have been originally written to protect individual rights," 3
its definition of discrimination is necessarily group-centered: in order to
determine if there has been discrimination, the individual's membership
in a group must be taken into account.
8 4
The principle method of protecting individual rights under Title VII
has been to challenge employment practices that show a pattern of dis-
crimination or have discriminatory impact on minorities. 1 5 Title VII
proscribes both overt discrimination and practices that are facially neu-
tral but have a discriminatory effect.'8 6 Underrepresentation of minori-
ties is ascribed to discrimination unless the employer can show
otherwise.' 87 Therefore, if an individual challenging an employment
practice can prove disparate impact, that individual's remedy is necessar-
ily based on her membership in a minority group.
In the absence of direct evidence of past discrimination, voluntary
affirmative action is also acceptable under Title VII.'88 Private'8 9 and
public' 90 employers may adopt race-conscious hiring or promotion plans
as part of a voluntary affirmative action program to address a "conspicu-
ous . . . imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories." '91 .The
179. Tribe, Vision, supra note 166, at 202.
180. FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 36.
181. See, e.g., Delahunty, supra note 68, at 468.
182. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) ('[u]nlawful... to discriminate against, any individual").
183. See FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 40.
184. This is true whether or not that individual is a member of a minority or non-minority
group.
185. See FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 40-41.
186. See 1991 Civil Rights Act, supra note 2. The 1991 Civil Rights Act restored antidis-
crimination law to the state articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971).
187. See FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 41. Griggs proscribed the use of any selection proce-
dure that was "fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
188. See FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 49-50.
189. See United Steel Workers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979).
190. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 630 (1987).
191. FAIRNESS, supra note 23, at 49 (quoting the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights
Under Law).
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Supreme Court has sanctioned voluntary affirmative action because,
given the Nation's concern over correcting past discrimination, it would
not make sense to prohibit "all... race-conscious efforts to abolish tradi-
tional patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy." '192
Race norming would not be valid under equal protection or under
Title VII,193 but other score adjustment mechanisms designed to reduce
or eliminate adverse racial impact of employment selection procedures
and designed to avoid violation of Title VII have been upheld. 1 94 Cases
lending support for racial preferences, combined with the Court's deter-
mination that race-conscious measures are appropriate under specific cir-
cumstances, indicate that there may be a constitutional method for
utilizing race-conscious measures in conjunction with employment tests.
B. Proposals for Valid Race-Conscious Plans
1. Compelling or Substantial Government Interest
A race-conscious hiring plan must pass either strict or intermediate
scrutiny, depending on whether the plan is promulgated by a state or
federal agency, respectively.1 95 In Chicago's case, therefore, the city
would first have to show specific evidence of past discrimination against
minority police officers. If the city meets this burden, it could institute a
race-conscious hiring plan as long as this plan does not unduly burden
white officers.
Use of the GATB demands a different solution. In its previous ap-
plication with state employment agencies implementing the actual exam,
race norming would fail under strict scrutiny. Yet, because the GATB is
sponsored by the U.S.E.S., a federal agency, Congress could legislate in
favor of creating a diverse workforce and against an exam that eliminates
capable workers from consideration. This would place race-conscious
measures used in conjunction with the GATB under intermediate
scrutiny.
192. Id. at 47 (quoting Local 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S.
501, 516 (1986)).
193. See supra parts II.A.l., II.A.2., and II.B.1.
194. Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv., 628 F.2d 796, 798-99 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 980 (1981); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correctional
Serv., 711 F.2d 1117, 1126-27 (2d Cir. 1983). The Ninth and D.C. Circuits, however, have not
followed the Second Circuit in upholding this type of remedy. See San Francisco Police Of-
ficers Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 812 F.2d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 1987), vacated
as moot, 842 F.2d 1126 (9th Cir. 1988); Hammon v. Barry, 813 F.2d 412, 431-32 (D.C. Cir.
1987), cert denied, 486 U.S. 1036 (1988).
195. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 493-94 (1989) (plurality
opinion); Metro Broadcasting v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 603 (1990).
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2. Less Burdensome Race-Conscious Alternatives
Whether a race-conscious measure must meet a compelling or only a
substantial government interest, it still must not be unduly burdensome.
One D.O.L. suggestion is to evaluate an applicant based on exam
results plus other referral tools. 19 It is not clear what these other refer-
ral tools might be, but this suggestion is in line with the Harvard Admis-
sions Plan, cited favorably by Justice Powell in Bakke.197 The goal for
employment would be the same as that for admissions: race would be
considered as a factor in overall evaluation.
Finally, there is one race-conscious measure that has already been
applied to employment exams and has survived scrutiny at the federal
appellate level."' This race-conscious measure is called "banding", and
it first gained approval in Bridgeport Guardians v. City of Bridgeport.99
The banding technique selects a range of scores with differences that are
not statistically significant and then provides for promotions from a band
range, considering additional factors such as race or ethnicity, gender,
work experience, and dependability.2" The court in Bridgeport Guardi-
ans specifically disapproved of race norming and distinguished banding
from it. The merit in banding is its simple ability to recognize and ac-
commodate the fact that several candidates within a general range will
perform well on the job even though they score differently on an exam.
The Ninth Circuit recently upheld banding in San Francisco Police
Officers Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco,0 1 citing Bridgeport
Guardians with approval and again distinguishing between banding and
race norming.
Conclusion
Even if the current weakly predictive general ability job tests were
relatively culturally unbiased, this does not mean we should happily em-
brace their use. As posited by Professor Kelman, they may fail to com-
port with the demands of liberal, individualistic meritocracy, and this
failure should be of particular concern when these nonmeritocratic tests
burden members of historically oppressed groups.20 2
196. See Termination, supra note 26, at A10.
197. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-17 (1978) (plurality opinion).
198. Bridgeport Guardians v. City of Bridgeport, 735 F. Supp. 1126, 1136-37 (D. Conn.
1990); San Francisco Police Officers Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 979 F.2d 721,
728 (9th Cir. 1992).
199. 735 F.Supp. 1126, 1136-37 (D. Conn. 1990), aff'd, 933 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1991).
200. Bridgeport Guardians, 735 F. Supp. at 1129.
201. San Francisco Police Officers Ass'n v. City and County of San Francisco, 979 F.2d
721, 728 (9th Cir. 1992).
202. See generally Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job Test-
ing, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1158 (1991).
rVol. 20:877
RACE NORMING
If we try to remedy these failures, the question that arises is whether
the approach should be color-blind or color-conscious. Justice Black-
mun's dissent in Bakke is still a powerful and viable statement in favor of
race-conscious measures: "In order to get beyond racism, we must first
take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some
persons equally, we must treat them differently."2 °3 While colorblind-
ness might be an ultimate philosophical ideal, "a remedial regime predi-
cated on colorblindness will have little influence at [the] deep level of
social and legal consciousness [of race] because it cannot adequately




The goal of affirmative action is to ensure equal employment oppor-
tunity to every person. The use of the GATB should only be continued if
race-conscious measures such as banding are used in conjunction with
the test to ensure that minorities are not unfairly selected out of the job
market.
203. 438 U.S. 265, 407 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
204. Aleinikoff, supra note 170, at 1062.
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